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Rozum przeciwko intelektowi. Uwagi o kontemplacyjnym wymiarze filozofii

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dc.contributor.author Stępień, Tomasz
dc.date.accessioned 2023-03-06T07:38:13Z
dc.date.available 2023-03-06T07:38:13Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.citation Roczniki Teologiczne Warszawsko-Praskie, 2004-2008, t. 4, s. 101-118. pl_PL
dc.identifier.issn 1643-4870
dc.identifier.uri http://repozytorium.theo-logos.pl/xmlui/handle/123456789/4619
dc.description.abstract Greek philosophy from its beginning was described as a contemplation of reality (contemplano rerum). It is already shown in the testimonials about the philosophical life in the Pythagorean School. After the Plato’s discovery of super sensual reality contemplation was conceived as seeing of the intellectual truth. Aristotelian theoretical cognition (theoria) could be also described as passive activity of the intellect. Further development of this issue was delivered by Neo-Platonists who understood Intellect as the second hypostasis. The most perfect activity of Intellect was contemplationseeing of the One. All those issues were passed to medieval philosophy, and we can see their most developed stage in the writings of st. Thomas Aquinas. He underlines that, the contemplation is a passive activity of potential intellect (intellectus possibilis) which is different from the active cognition of reason. Intellect sees the truth but reason strives to achieve truth which in this case is a result of reasoning. Unfortunately in modem and contemporary philosophy the passive aspect of human intellectual cognition was completely abandoned. All differences between intellectual powers of human soul have disappeared. It can be already seen in Descartes Second meditation where all terms like reason (ratio), intellect (intellectus), mind (mens) etc. are used to describe one res cogitans. This means that Descartes suggests that there is no difference between those terms, and no difference between intellectual powers of human soul. Res cogitans can no longer see or contemplate the truth, it becomes one and only base of any truth and all philosophical knowledge. There are two most important consequences of Cartesian thought, which can be seen in modem and contemporary philosophy. Firstly, the most important philosophical problem becomes the question of how the human cognition could be objective, and be somehow linked with external reality. Secondly philosophy no longer answers to human desire of truth. In all ancient and medieval philosophy contemplation of super sensual reality was conceived as a source of man’s ultimate happiness. The road to such happiness become closed, because all that man can now contemplate are the products of his own mind. pl_PL
dc.language.iso pl pl_PL
dc.publisher Wyższe Seminarium Duchowne Diecezji Warszawsko-Praskiej pl_PL
dc.rights Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Poland *
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pl/ *
dc.subject rozum pl_PL
dc.subject intelekt pl_PL
dc.subject kontemplacja pl_PL
dc.subject filozofia pl_PL
dc.subject szczęście pl_PL
dc.subject mind pl_PL
dc.subject intellect pl_PL
dc.subject contemplation pl_PL
dc.subject philosophy pl_PL
dc.subject happiness pl_PL
dc.title Rozum przeciwko intelektowi. Uwagi o kontemplacyjnym wymiarze filozofii pl_PL
dc.title.alternative Reason against intellect. Remarks on contemplative aspect of philosophy pl_PL
dc.type Article pl_PL


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