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The Genocide of Chechens in the Context of Russian-Chechen Conflict – a Historical Outline

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to present the genesis of the Chechen-Russian conflict, including the genocide of Chechens. The analysis explains how the aggressive actions of the Russian authorities were supposed to deal with “the strongest and most dangerous nation” of the Caucasus, in order to subjugate this region. Russian behaviour proves that their priority over the centuries was not an assimilation of Chechens and the peaceful solution of the conflict, but rather an “imperial” dimension of the strife, or to be exact, the ultimate conquest of the Caucasus, even if it would mean the extermination of the Chechen nation.

Keywords

Chechnya, Russia, genocide, Caucasus, terrorism.

1. Conquest of the Caucasus by the Russian Empire

On investigating the nature of Caucasian war, and mostly the conflict in Chechnya, it is essential to decide if, or to what degree, the Russian actions may be called ‘genocide’. The history of the conflict in this area goes back to the 18th Century. The Russian army entered Chechnya in 1721 for the first time, when Tzar Peter I undertook a successful military expedition against Persia. As a result of this war, Persia ceded Azerbaijan and Dagestan to the Russian empire.

Initially, the Russian policy towards the mountain nations was based on economical expansion. Following recommendations from St-Petersburg, the tzarist administration supported the exchange of goods with the natives to make

them dependent on Russian markets¹. In parallel to pursuing an open and peaceful policy towards these mountain nations, Russia strove to expand and strengthen its fortresses which laid along the left side of the Terek river. On multiple occasions, the tsarist administration attempted to interfere in the affairs of those Chechen communities which took an oath of submission to the empire.

Conditions in Caucasus changed with reign of Catherine II. During a forty-year war with Turkey the Empress established a new line of fortifications stretching from Mozdok to Kizlyar. According to J.Z. Achmadow, “it was an aggressive move, which gave the Empress the ability to impose a blockade on mountain nations which lived along the Terek river”². The more and more brutal policy of Catherine II towards mountain dwellers, carried out by punitive expeditions, forced submission to the empire on those nations of the Caucasus, which had not yet taken an oath of loyalty.

The Empress also gradually executed a plan of Russification of the natives. The first church school was established in 1765, where Ossetian and Ingush children learnt the Russian language and Christianity. Moreover, the northern Caucasus was settled with Russian peasants and the empire’s administration was introduced in those regions. Those actions were accompanied by a more and more aggressive stance towards the natives. It caused the first uprising in Chechnya to break out in 1785. It was led by Ushurma, who would later take the title Sheikh Mansur and become a symbol of national unity throughout Chechen history. Eventually Mansur was defeated in 1791. Summarizing the first stage of colonization of Chechnya it is worth noting the nature of Russian actions. Undoubtedly, if Moscow had carried out the expansion by economical means, it would have quickly and painlessly incorporated the small Caucasian country. However, by using military means, it caused a quite contrary response – strengthening of anti-Russian attitudes among most of Chechen people.

2. The Caucasian War 1816–1864 and Shamil’s Imamate

The next stage of bilateral relations was the Caucasian war that lasted from 1816 till 1864. The cause of the conflict was a plan made by

¹ P. Grochmalski, *Czeczenia. Rys prawdziwy*, Wrocław 1999, p. 33.

² Я. Ахмадов, *Взаимоотношения народов Чечено-Ингушетии с Россией в XVIII в.*, Грозны 1991, p. 79.

General Aleksey Yermolov, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, to move Russian fortifications from the existing line on the Terek river to the Sunzha river deep inside Chechen lands. The czar accepted Yermolov's plan in 1818, which meant that the Chechen people's most fertile lands would become incorporated into the empire. In a letter to the czar, Yermolov admitted that annexing the Caucasus would not be possible without a final confrontation with the Chechens, who "appear to be the strongest and most dangerous nation"³. In literature it is often stated that Yermolov intentionally sought to provoke a war in order to get a pretext to exterminate the Chechen people. He saw no other way for the permanent seizure of the Caucasus⁴. Yermolov explained how the military solution would be employed in relations with Caucasian nations: "Our victories will lead us to the last bandits' (i.e. Chechens) hideouts. I am not abandoning my system of stamping out those thieves by any means necessary. The most important way is starvation and that is why I strive to get to those valleys where they can still farm and graze their cattle"⁵. Chechens opposed the territorial expansion of the empire. In 1821 a Chechen, Beybulat Taymi, a former tsarist officer, declared a holy war against Russia. Shamil, one of the greatest leaders of the uprising, became Imam of the nations of upper Dagestan. Shamil had extraordinary organisational and military talent and won multiple victories over Russian armies. He was the first to establish the foundations of government in a Caucasian country that spread over northern Caucasus. "Shamil's Imamate was created during wartime and was a result of that war. It was a country of warlike nation"⁶ – wrote J. Achmadov. The personal guard of Shamil consisted of some Polish cavalymen who deserted from the Russian army. In 1855, after an unsuccessful defence of the Akhoulgo stronghold, Shamil was forced to negotiate a peace treaty with the Russians. As a sign of good will, he handed over his first born son, Jamal Al-Din, as an amanat (Caucasian name for a hostage to guarantee good will during negotiations). In later years Shamil's forces repeatedly opposed tsarist armies. He was eventually and ultimately defeated on 25 August 1859 in

³ З. Шахбиев, *Судьба чечено-ингушского народа*, Москва 1996, p. 402.

⁴ P. Grochmalski, *Czeczecenia. Rys prawdziwy...*, p. 38.

⁵ *Энциклопедический словарь*. Издатели: Р.А. Брокгауз и И.А. Ефрон, т. XIII, 1894, p. 856.

⁶ Я. Ахмадов, *Имамат Шамиля государство горцев Чечни и Дагестана*, in: Сост. и общ. ред. Ю.А. Айдаева, *Чеченцы: История и современность*, Москва 1996, p. 179.

Gunib Aul in central Dagestan. During this cruel war, in order to quell the uprising Russian commanders committed atrocities that were revealed by Russian writers. According to N. Krowiakow, “tsarist headquarters send frequent expeditions to destroy Chechen auls and exterminate its inhabitants. The savagery of those expeditions seems to be unbelievable, but it is confirmed by the participants of those events”⁷. Memoirs of Russian officers tell of their actions in Chechen lands: “We pushed the mountaineers out of woody hills and made them flee. Heaps of hacked heads and hands, which we carried back to our headquarters, proved our bravery. (...) On 13th our troops moved out in huge columns for a big village of Kyjsyn Irzay and burned every encountered house. (...) The village fell after furious shooting and was laid to waste. On 14th the whole cavalry was busy with destroying fields of almost ripe corn along the Bassa river. (...) We extended the forest cleaning and burned Chechen villages along Baguto-Tawion by the way. We were doing pretty well, without much stir from the mountaineers, who were forced to submit or to lose their lands and escape to the mountains, where they faced shortage of food. For five days, everyday, the systematic burning of villages stretching along Diaya river and destruction of supplies of corn, millet, hay etc. took place. (...) The thick and black smoke from those fires covered the horizon and everything around smelled of dreadful burning”⁸.

Another massacre in the Duba-Yurt village in March 1847 is described as follows: “Ten minutes after the start of the bloody carnage on the streets and in houses, orderly Laudansky came to Meller and reported that furious soldiers from both rotas do not take prisoners. *This is butchery* – Laudansky summarized – *terrifying*. Driven by curiosity to see the unfolding drama up close, I whipped the horse and rode along the street leading to the storey building. With my own eyes I saw pictures of terrible, bloody slaughter. The mass of the victims’ bodies was enough to block the passage through narrow alleys of the village. My bay (i.e. horse) oftentimes refused to go further and I needed the stick to force it to jump over heaps of dead bodies laying on the streets. And the way those bodies were butchered. Over there an old man lies stretched on the street, almost naked, with deep sabre wounds in his abdomen and on his chest. Next to him, a five year old boy tries to wake him

⁷ Н. Кровяков, *Шамиль, Черкесск* 1990, p. 74.

⁸ P. Grochmalski, *Czeczenia. Rys prawdziwy...*, p. 89–90.

up with screams and tears. A completely naked body of a beautiful, 17-year old girl lies two meters from a house. Tens of corpses with severed hands and legs, twisted in different directions, were scattered around”⁹.

Eventually, the uprising was quelled in 1864, when Russian armies displaced the uprising Chechen army from the last lands it occupied on the Mzymta river. General Oreust stated then: “there is no un-subjugated tribe in the whole area of Caucasus”¹⁰.

The exact figures of casualties in the Caucasian war are unknown. The estimations range from one third to half of the population¹¹. Thus, one of the results of the war was the extermination of the Chechen nation. Even after incorporating Ichkeria into the empire, Moscow continued to displace locals and settled subordinates loyal to Russia instead. Additionally, the Caucasian war is proof that mass deportations were not an “invention” of Joseph Stalin, but were already successfully implemented by the tsarist regime. Taking into account the subsequent struggle with Russian invaders it is important to note that Chechens could refer to traditions of their own national state.

3. Stalinist methods of oppression of Chechens

The situation of the nations of Northern Caucasus changed with the establishment of the Soviet State. In 1921 the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (A.S.S.R) that included Ingushetia, Ossetia, Balkaria, Kabardia and Karachay–Cherkessia was created. A year later, Stalin established the Chechen Autonomous Oblast. Limiting the freedom of mountaineers and increasing Bolshevik influence progressed slowly, but steadily. Mountaineers were prohibited to bear arms, which was one of the privileges they had received after the end of the Caucasian war. Chechens were removed from many posts and were forced to give most of their property for collective farms (kolkhoz). Many of them were arrested on suspicion of preparing an uprising against the Bolshevik rule.

Stalin, whose intention was to antagonize the Chechen and Ingush people against each other, combined them into one entity, forming the Chechen-

⁹ Ibidem, p. 90.

¹⁰ *Энциклопедический словарь...*, p. 861–862.

¹¹ *Энциклопедический словарь „Гранат”*, Москва 1940, т. 58, p. 183.

Ingush Autonomous Oblast in 1934. Two years later it was turned into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R). Mass arrests began behind the facade of eliminating the hostile, anti-soviet “element” in 1937. They lasted continuously till 1938. In spite of all the network of stations and NKVD units, mountains remained the only area where guerrilla fighting continued. In 1944 Stalin made a decision to deport the mountain nations of the Caucasus. Most of them were to be moved to Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. The operation resulted in many casualties. Older Chechens who did not speak Russian and did not respond to the orders were shot as an example and warning to others. Sick people and those who were incapable of traveling were shot on the spot. The most dreadful episode happened in the village of Khaibakh. All older and sick people, together with pregnant women and infants, were locked in a stable of the local kolkhoz. An order was given to set fire to the building. “When flames engulfed the stables, a large, solid gate collapsed under pressure from people and a crowd of terrified people rushed outside through the flames. Gveshiani ordered *fire!* Those of the crowd who ran first fell and blocked the exit. A whole mountain of corpses blocked the way of the escaping people. Nobody survived”¹². Lavrenty Beria received only a short note: “due to the impossibility of transportation and to meet the deadline of the *Mountain* operation I was forced to annihilate over 700 inhabitants of the village Khaibakh. Colonel Gveshiani”¹³. Beria’s reply was short as well: “for decisive actions during the deportations of Chechens in the area of Khaibakh you are to be presented with a government award and promoted”¹⁴.

Beria wrote that a total of 496,460 Ingush and Chechens were displaced, however there is no doubt that those were the people settled in the place of exile, so the number of deportees had to be even greater. In places of exile those “special deportees”, as the migrated nations were officially called, were billeted. Exiles were allowed to move within districts up to three kilometers. Any further journey required a special authorization. NKVD outposts and barriers were

¹² С. Э. Бицоев, *Инквизиция*, in: С. Алиева, *Так это было. Национальные репрессии в СССР 1919 – 1952 годы (документы, воспоминания, фольклор, публицистика, проза, поэзия, драматургия)*, Т 2, p. 182.

¹³ Д. Дудаев, *Тернистый путь к свободе. Правительственные документы чеченской республики, статьи, интервью*, Вильнюс 1993, p. 26.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 27.

placed between villages populated by the exiles. Adults were required to check in once a month in the commander's office.

Almost 500,000 people were displaced from their homeland, including 400,000 Chechens and 90,000 Ingush people. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union issued a decree “on the dissolution of the Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Oblast” on 7th March 1944. The Soviet authorities, intended to erase the Chechen–Ingush state from the map of the Caucasus by deporting Nakh people to Central Asia. Under the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council the country was divided into four parts: almost all of Ingushetia was incorporated into the North Ossetian A.S.S.R, lands of the eastern Chechnya were merged into the Dagestan A.S.S.R, the southern alpine region became a part of the Georgian S.S.R, while the northern and central regions of the former autonomous republic became the Grozny Okrug, as a part of Stavropol Territory that was a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In the end, however, Stalinist chekists failed to remove all indigenous inhabitants from the Nakh country. Some abrekhs, i.e. insurgents, and those who managed to join them, around two thousand people, survived in their homeland by hiding in the mountains. They continued the unequal struggle with their long time enemy¹⁵.

It wasn't until the Khrushchev Thaw in 1956 that the autonomy for Chechens and Ingush people was restored. However, Chechens that returned home faced another disappointment. “Over the years of the exile of the nation, a new generation grew up, and that generation was still led to believe that their parents were traitors. They came to live on the family land with the knowledge that they were still second-class citizens and were still not at home. They were morally repressed by the everyday experience, which showed that everyone could continue to humiliate them”¹⁶.

Another humiliation was an imposed ban on settling in upper regions of Chechnya. The prohibition included not only burying the dead in cemeteries located in mountainous areas, but also even visiting family graves in these cemeteries.

¹⁵ A. Lieven, *Chechnya Tombstone of Russian Power*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1998, p. 319–320.

¹⁶ З. Шахбиев, *Судьба чечено-ингушского народа*, Москва 1996, p. 265.

4. The Strive for Chechen independence, further Russian attempts to solve the Chechen problem

Despite a recreation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the USSR policy towards nationalities did not change. Unity was maintained by one party and terror.

The situation changed in the time of perestroika. In 1987 the “Kavkaz” association, and soon after the Perestroika Support Association, were established. In 1989 the most important organization – Bart that strove to achieve full sovereignty for Chechnya was created. The Vainakh Democratic Party, that was established a year later, had a similar goal. The All-National Congress of the Chechen People gathered in November 1990 and proclaimed Independence of Chechen Republic.

An agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya was signed in 1992. A few months later there was an accident which could have started a war between Chechnya and Russia. During the conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia the Russian Army gave support to the Ossetian forces, and entered Chechen territory. The president of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudayev, considered this military aggression and threatened that if Russian troops did not leave the republic within 24 hours he would be forced to declare war. Although Russia decided to withdraw its army, it also imposed an economic, and later financial blockade on the republic. This led to a sharp economic breakdown. The old fashioned economy, deprived of its markets, was going bankrupt. Russia intended to starve Chechnya and thus trigger a wave of social unrest, which in turn would lead to the overthrowing of the president of the republic.

Russian tactics against rebellious Chechnya were based on several simultaneous methods. In addition to the economic blockade and, in fact, isolation of the republic, the Russians resorted to the use of propaganda as well. State controlled media began to portray Chechens as the source of evil, corruption a dangerous unruly mob. These activities were to prepare Russian society for a possible war as well as to justify possible military intervention. Clearly the anti-Chechen attitude was adopted by Sergei Stepashin, the head of the newly created Federal Counter-Intelligence Service. As David Remnick wrote “At the end of 1994 Stepashin convinced Yeltsin that he could carry out a strategic operation in Grozny which would result in Dudayev being removed from power with minimal bloodshed. He also assured him that the forces

opposing Dudayev would do all the dirty work. Stepashin's agents who worked in the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service in the local branch of the former KGB developed a plan to supply weapons to the opposition and to take control of Grozny. The Kremlin promised to pay each soldier a thousand dollars for participation in this treacherous action"¹⁷.

4a. The First Chechen War

Russian invasion forces entered Chechnya without a declaration of war on Sunday, 11th December 1994. From that moment onward a guerrilla war began, during which the Russians suffered significant casualties in clashes with Chechen fighters hiding in the mountains. The main problems for Russian forces was fighting in the cities for which Russian soldiers and commanders were completely unprepared, as well as for the transfer of the fighting outside Chechnya. In June 1995 Shamil Basayev carried out a terrorist raid on a hospital in Budyonnovsk, and in January 1996 a similar action, led by another Chechen commander, Salman Raduyev, took place in a hospital in Kizlyar¹⁸. A few months later Dzhokhar Dudayev was killed in a Russian missile attack. Eventually, the First Chechen War ended on 31st August 1996 when the armistice was signed in Khasav-Yurt. One of the provisions of the treaty was to postpone the problem of the status of the republic for five years. The conflict caused the death of 70,000 to 90,000 people, and more than 240,000 were injured.

4b. Filtration camps

One of the new elements of breaking Chechen resistance, initiated during the First Chechen War, were so called filtration camps meaning places where potential Chechen fighters were detained after being captured by Russian soldiers. The first of such camps were created as far back as 12th December 1994 by the Russian Interior Ministry as "field custody". They were situated near big cities, but their locations were classified by the Russian Authorities. Officially Russia admits creating several such camps, but it is likely that many more existed. People who survived the filtration camps say that they are more like concentration camps than arrests, because of the conditions, and a large percentage of people lost their lives there – there are no exact

¹⁷ D. Remnick, *Zmartwychwstanie*, Warszawa 1997, p. 277.

¹⁸ S. Ciesielski, *Wojna w Czeczenii 1994–1996*, in: J. Brodowski, M. Smoleń (Ed.), *Czeczenia-Rosja. Mity i rzeczywistość*, Kraków 2006, p. 40.

figures, but it is said that up to 80% of those detained died in such camps. In 2001, 20,000 Chechens were imprisoned in the filtration camps.

The following tortures are used in filtration camps:

Mental tortures:

- mock executions
- sounds of tortures broadcast via speakers at night
- forced watching of torturing of other prisoners
- humiliation of national and religious feelings and dignity of the prisoner

Physical torture:

- Electric shocks – introducing a current to the victim’s genitals, ears, nose, occipita or armpits
- “Swallow” – hanging a person head first with legs and arms tied together behind a person’s back
- Gas mask – a gas mask is put on victim’s head and the respiratory tube is closed, which causes the tortured person to lose consciousness
- Feeding – victim’s tongue is seriously wounded and then the victim is forced to eat hot gruel with too much salt and pepper in it
- “Wolf canines”- dental torture, victim is tied or handcuffed to a chair, a wooden peg is put into his mouth and his teeth are sawn with a file
- “Round table” – handcuffed prisoners are seated at the table and their tongues are nailed to it¹⁹.

5. Second Chechen War

A period of relative peace was established in Chechnya from 1996 till 1999. However, this period of independence came to an abrupt end in the summer of 1999. There were two reasons for a new Russian military intervention. Firstly, troops led by Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab entered the neighboring Republic of Dagestan with the purpose of establishing Islamic caliphate in Caucasus. Secondly, there were bombings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Ryazan in September of the same year. The state controlled media accused “Chechen terrorists” of carrying out those attacks²⁰. Those bombings might have been organized by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB),

¹⁹ Amnesty International, *Raport roczny AI 2001*, 24.06.2010.

²⁰ J. Ferenc, *Świat odwraca wzrok. Czeczenia w świetle prawa i w oczach świata*, Toruń 2004, p. 62.

whose agents had been caught red-handed while preparing another bombing in the city of Ryazan. Sergei Kovalev, while speculating on the attack, said: “we don’t know who carried out the bombings of the apartments. We know who used it. It was the campaign staff of Vladimir Putin”²¹.

5a. Attempt to discredit Chechnya on the international arena

Russian authorities used the apartment bombings for a media campaign against Islamic Fundamentalists from Chechnya. They were called terrorists, and Putin himself promised that he would pursue the Chechen terrorists “even in the privy”. “International terrorism, Militant Islam, Wahhabism are only products of the Russian propaganda” – wrote Christine Kurczab-Redlich, and added: “to make the upcoming genocide acceptable – mostly for the sensitive West – the Stalinist way was again employed – Chechnya was linked with intentional terrorism, the most topical problem for the West”²².

From this point of view a remark made by a Russian director and screenwriter Andrei Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky is also true. “Chechens are also humans. We all are humans! The crazy ones, the normal ones. Not every Chechen is a terrorist and not every terrorist is a Chechen! Russians also tend to be terrorists. Muslims attack in response to the aggression of the expansive West”²³.

It is true that during the war Chechen militants radicalized their actions by carrying out terrorist attacks, for instance, the attack on Dubrovka Theater in 2002 or the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004, however, Moscow did not try to negotiate or find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Although the Second Caucasian War ended officially on 16th April 2009, the Northern Caucasus remains an unstable region and a source of multiple social and political problems. Moreover, it seems that the mutual animosity between Russians and the people of the Caucasus has not weakened, but is getting stronger²⁴. This is indicated by intensification of anti-Caucasian sentiment in Russian society and the hostile attitude towards immigrants from Caucasus, as well as by radicalization of the Chechen armed underground which does not refrain from acts of terrorism.

²¹ K. Kurczab-Redlich, *Głowa o mur Kremla*, Warszawa 2007, p. 253.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 354.

²³ Ł. Figielski, *Polska też jest sterroryzowana przez Amerykę*, Wywiad z Andriejem Konczalowskim, www.stopklatka.pl/-/6664944,-i-polska-tez-jest-skolonizowana-przez-ameryke-i-rozmowa-z-andriejem-konczalowskim (27.09.2004).

²⁴ J. Diec, *Naród rosyjski w poczuciu zagrożenia*, in: J. Brodowski, M. Smoleń (ed.), *Czeczenia-Rosja. Mity i rzeczywistość*, Kraków 2006, p. 85–94.

6. Conclusions

The above analysis confirms that Russian leaders will do anything to prevent the establishment of the independence of Chechnya. They will use all possible means to control the situation in the Northern Caucasus. They are less than concerned by the enormity of the crime that they must commit to achieve their goal. At the same time Chechens are defiant, proud and freedom-loving as evidenced by their motto – “Death or Freedom” (“Jozhalla ya marsho”). Russian authorities do not even endeavour to win over rebellious Chechens peacefully. Anti-Chechen propaganda in the Russian media and statements made by the Russian politicians strengthen the anti-Caucasian prejudices in Russian society.

According to Russians the nations dwelling in the Caucasus are characterized by unpredictability, pride, aggression, cruelty and ... innate hatred towards Russians. These elements are enough to emphasize their alienation and even hostility, and to justify the brutal policies towards the mountain nations. According to Alexei Levinson, the Caucasian people have become regarded in Russia as “the modern Jew”²⁵ – a group that arouses phobias in the ethnic majority because they proudly present their “otherness”²⁶. However, although the phobia towards immigrants from the Caucasus, particularly Chechens, is still strong, it is the “geopolitical thinking” that makes the Russian authorities regard Chechnya as “theirs”. There is an ongoing, constant process of forcing the republic to be loyal towards Russia, imposing Russian identity on Chechens and preventing the separation of the republic from the Russian state. In this case it can be said that the imperial mindset is at work, which means separating “our” land from “not-our” population²⁷. Therefore, if the population is treated

²⁵ In Russian awareness, Jews were regarded by the indigenous inhabitants as a “foreign” minority whose rights had to be limited. Anti-Semitism and accusations that Jews were destabilizing the country increased in XIX century. After 1917 their presence has been associated with the activities of the Bolshevik movement. Discrimination of Jews began in the 20th century and took form of multiple campaigns: firstly against “Jewish mob”, then against cosmopolitanism, and finally against Zionism (Sixties to Eighties). After the collapse of the USSR a negative image of Jews reappears in the programs of nationalist parties. A Jew is an enemy of all, a personification of external and internal forces seeking to destroy Russia. Compare: J. Smaga, *Żydzi*, in: A. de Lazari (ed.) *Idee w Rosji*, t. III, Łódź 2000, p. 158, 168.

²⁶ А. Левинсон, *Кавказ подо мною*, in: Л. Гудков (Ed.) *Образ врага*, Москва 2005, p. 280.

²⁷ Т. Ворожейкина, *Примеров трансформации континентальных империй в гражданские нации в истории не существует*, in: *После Империи*, (ред.) И.М. Клямкин, Москва 2007, p. 193.

as “not-our”, alien and hostile, then any crime against it could be considered just or necessary for the welfare of the state.

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