Zagadnienie sensu i demarkacji we wczesnych pismach Ludwiga Wittegensteina, Rudolfa Carnapa i Karla R. Poppera

Abstract

The demarcation problem is often formulated as that of distinguishing between science and metaphysics. In this formulation metaphysics must be taken in a broad sense to include both general religious and philosophical doctrines, such as the theories produced by philosophers, and pseudosciences, such as astrology. As far as the twentieth century is concerned, the Vienna Circle lead by Rudolf Carnap concentrated more on demarcation problem in order to condemn the general theories produced by philosophers as sheer nonsense. Metaphysical doctrines, being empirically notverifiable, do not concern the territory in which truth and falsehood are at stake. Popper, on the other hand, devoted more attention to the question of science versus pseudo-science, arguing that metaphysics can play a significant role even in science itself. Wittgenstein’s attitudes were still different from those of Carnap and Popper. Although in the Tractatus he held the view that metaphysics was meaningless, and his argument was interpreted by Carnap as an attack on philosophy and religion, in reality, being a man of strong religious leanings, he was offering an intellectually sophisticated defence of religion by removing religious and metaphysical doctrines from the sphere of scientific criticism.